Gold: end of an era? by anonymous
"Gold is a wonderful clearer of the understand-
ing," wrote Thomas Addison in a 1711 issue ofthe
Spectator, yet many misconceptions have grown up
around the lustrous metal during the intervening
centuries. In an attempt to clarify the situation as it
stands in the mid-1970's, this special issue of the
Review presents three analytical articles written
against the background of recent far-reaching
changes in U.S. gold policy. Within a brief half-
decade, we have witnessed the creation of the two-
tier gold market, two devaluations ofthe dollar, and
now in 1975, the lifting ofthe longstanding ban on
the private ownership ofgold, followed by the auc-
tioningofasmall portion ofthe nation's gold stock.
In the first article, Hang-Sheng Cheng and
Nicholas P. Sargen place these recent events in his-
torical perspective, before analyzing the reasons
for the U.S. Government's decision to end the
monetaryroleof gold. They consider several tradi-
tional arguments advanced by advocates of
gold-forexample, the need for the "discipline" of
the gold standard to set prescribed automatic limits
to the power of the nation's monetary authorities.
But they note thatthe world economy in the heyday
ofthe gold standard did not benefitfrom such disci-
pline, but instead was characterized by wide fluctu-
ations in both output and prices. Again, gold sup-
posedly has provided a safer asset than national
currencies-but in their view, this argument puts
the cart before the horse. It was the official support
ofthe price ofgold that sustained its value, and not
the reverse.
In accounting for the recent shift in U.S. policy,
Cheng and Sargen point to an element ofinstability
in the Bretton Woods gold-dollar standard after
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World War II, because of an asymmetry in its
exchange-rate adjustment mechanism. Any other
country could change a "fundamental disequilib-
rium" in its balance of payments by altering the
exchange rate of its currency against the U.S.
dollar-but the United States, with its currency
pegged to gold, was poorly situated to change its
exchange rate. This asymmetrical situation was
compounded by a devaluation bias in exchange-rate
adjustments, which permitted surplus countries to
postpone or avoid revaluation, while deficit coun-
tries were forced to devalue by their weakening re-
serve positions. Consequently, when the U.S. al-
lowed its domestic inflationrateto get outofhandin
the late 1960's, the dollar became increasingly
overvalued, and this resulted in massive accumula-
tions ofdollars in foreign official holdings, as well
as adeclinein the competitiveposition ofAmerican
manufacturers in foreign and domestic markets.
In the meantime, Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs) developed as a major new reserve asset,
providing a superior alternative to gold. Unlike
gold, they earn interest, cost nothingto produce and
store, and provide means for an internationally con-
trolled growth of world liquidity.
Looking toward the future, Cheng and Sargen
note the existence of 1.2 billion ounces of gold in
official holdings-andperhaps 2.5 billionouncesin
private holdings-and they ask what may happen to
these stocks in the wake of the U.S. decision to
demonetize gold. Their conclusion is that the pros-
pects for a resurrection ofgold are rather dim. Un-
less a new"gold-center country" emerges to buy
and sell gold at some official price, gold may join
silver as just another historical relic. They evensuggest the possibility of governments selling off
their stocks. In that event, an international agree-
ment might be necessary to maintain the value of
official gold holdings, in orderto preserve the value
ofnational savings already embodiedinsuchassets.
In the second article, Kurt Dew contrasts the
1968-75 shift in U.S. gold policy with the policy of
the 1930's, when the Administration prohibited
private gold holdings and tried to push up gold
prices as a means ofsupportingfarm prices. Heasks
several questions about these quite dissimilar
episodes: Did the policies achieve their intended
results? Did external actions offset the intended be-
neficial effects? Did gold help in either case to ad-
vance the nation's economic welfare?
Dewargues thatthe policyofthe 1930'sachieved
its intended effect, but that it was a Pyrrhic victory,
in view ofthe severe problems caused in the Euro-
pean gold-bloc countries by the vast outflow ofgold
to the United States. A fundamental policy flaw in
that period was the tendency of both this country
and the gold-bloc nations to follow gold policies
rather than expansionary monetary policies.
Turning to the current situation, Dew says that
U.S. policy has achieved its intended effect by re-
legating gold to the same status as that ofany other
commodity. He considers several factors that could
offset the benefits of this policy, but argues that
each of these possibilities is rather remote. For ex-
ample, small individual investors and large institu-
tional investors could both create problems for the
economy by switching their assets into gold, but
they are not likely to have much incentive to do so.
Also, foreign and domestic financial authorities
will probably not repeat the perverse policy errors
of the 1930's, but will instead continue on their
present path of monetary cooperation.
In the third article, Michael W. Keran and
Michael Penzer examine the role of gold as a pri-
vate hedge against inflation. They note that the tim-
ing ofgold purchases is crucial; naturally, the inves-
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tor would have profited considerably if he had
bought in 1968 and sold in 1975, but he would have
lost half of his purchasing power if he had instead
boughtin 1934 and sold in 1968. Nextthey examine
the possible return on alternative investments, such
as other commodities, foreign currencies and
interest-bearing financial assets. These investments
at times have provided better returns than
gold-and without the accompanying problems,
such as the illiquidity of gold investment and the
large variance of gold prices.
Keran and Penzer then evaluate gold's future in
terms ofthe supply and demandfactors that have led
to the sharp price upsurge of the 1970's. On the
supply side, they note the20-percentdecline in flow
that occurred in the pastfour years, largely because
of the production problems of the dominant pro-
ducer, South Africa-but they contend that recent
peak prices should lead to production increases in
the longer run. Also, they argue that downward
price pressures could arise from the massive stocks
over-hanging the market; central-bank holdings
alone are more than 25 times larger than current
production.
On the demand side, Keran and Penzer note the
existence ofaflow demand for industrial, commer-
cial and artistic purposes, as well as a stock demand
for inventory building by central banks and private
investors and speculators. Flow demand could de-
cline because of the recession and because of the
very high price of gold. Stock demand could
weaken on the part of central banks, reflecting the
continued efforts to demonetize gold, and it could
also weaken for investors and speculators, to the
extent that inflationary expectations are somehow
kept in check. Thus, they conclude: caveatemptor.
Despite gold's excellent record as an investment in
the last several years, the remainder of the decade
will inevitably bring changes in the supply and de-
mand factors governing the price ofgold-changes
which could easily shift the price trend downward.